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Since the introduction of a nationallaw on industrial injury bene-
fits in 1901, a social security system has taken shape in The
Netherlands that can be ranked among the most highly developed
in the world. Even in a Western European context, it is known as
all embracing, generous and solidaristic. However, since the eco-
nomic crisis of the late 19705 and early 1980s, it has experienced
a process of al most continuous reconstruction. In this, the
Netherlands does not differ from many other European countries
which, as Ferge (1997) has argued, have geen the rise of a new
welfare paradigm, best characterised as 'the individualisation of
the social'. In the wake of economic globalisation this 'cult of indi-
vidual responsibility' has led to a fundamental transformation of
sodal provision. Access to universal protection schemes has been
!
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reduced, solidaristic social insurance programmes replaced by
individualistic, market-led private insurance, and social assistance
more strictly targeted on the really needy.
This chapter will consider the Dutch variant of this common
trend. It begins with a brief review of the historical development
of the social security system, outlining its underlying principles
and basic structure. It then looks more closely at recent attempts
to reconstruct the system, their implications, and the extent to
which the Dutch social security system has undergone a shift from
solidarity towards selectivity (1).
A history of coUective solidarity
The roots of the Dutch social security system lie in the late nine-
teenth century. As the social consequences of industrialisation
became apparent, fears of social disruption together with increas-
ing claims foT paar law support, gave rise to the conviction that
measures protecting people against social risks were necessary.
However, as was typical foT that time, the idea was that govern-
ment should intervene as little as possible. Instead of tax-based
national schemes, a programme of contributive social insurance
schemes was introduced. The government's fale was not to orga-
nize such schemes, but to stimulate their development and viabil-
ity by making contributions compulsory. In this way, during the
period between 1901 and the Second World War, a number af
schemes were introduced covering the risks of industrial injuries,
: invalidity, sickness and old age. All were confined to waged work-
, eTS, reflecting the broadly accepted principle of the 'just wage'.
This held that remuneration should cover situations in which a
worker would not be able to work because of factors beyond his
or her control. In other words contributions foT social insurance
were seen as a legitimate part of the wage-cost. Compu!sory
social protection foT the self-employed, however, was pre-empt-
ed, partly because of the cast, but primarily by the lack of a suffi-
ciently accepted legitimizing principle.
The pre-Second World War schemes were organized at com-
pany leve! or through separate sectors of industry, not at the
nationallevel. The social security system as a whole was patchy
and had a limited degree of collectiveness. It also had a limited
degree of redistributive solidarity. Since the schemes closely fal-
lowed the logic of private insurance, particularly bad risks were
excluded and contributions strongly risk related, resulting in little
cross-subsidisation of bad risks by good risks and of lower paid
workers by the higher paid. Generally, benefits were low and in
many cases did not reach subsistence level. Heavy state contribu-
tions to the social insurance funds were of ten necessary to guar-
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y antee benefit payrnents and levels and there were still many
e claims for paar law support. Cases not eligible for this had to rely
on the churches and charities.
1 Af ter the Second World War the Dutch social security system
t expanded rapidly. Inspired by the inadequacies of the pre-war sys-
; tem, hopes for a new and better society and, not least, the
; Beveridge Report, the Van Rhijn Commission presented its blue-
print for a new system in 1945. Significantly, the legitimizing
principle for social security was broadened from 'the just wage' to
the idea that:
society, organized in the state, is liable foT the social security and pro-
tection against want of all its members, on the condition, that citizens
themselves do all that can be reasonably expected in order to acquire
such security and protection' (Van Rhijn, 1945, p.4).
This principle opened the door for a system that encompassed all
citizens, not just waged workers.
In the years af ter the Van Rhijn report a number of so called
'people's insurances' were introduced, providing aid age, death
(survivors) and disability benefits for all citizens. These schemes
were bath highly collectivised, in the sense that they were
designed and controlled by the state, and 'solidaristic': bad risks
were not excluded and contributions were proportional to income
not risk. In specific cases people could claim benefits even if they
had never paid a contribution. The new principle also allowed for
the construction of a national safety net, or social assistance
scheme, which replaced the inadequate paar law. Social assis-
tance became strongly centralized af ter the fiTSt years of its exis-
tence revealed that a high degree of local discretion led to unac-
ceptable inequalities in the rights of citizens.
With respect to workers' insurance, it is important to note that
the new princip)e broadened the state's responsibility and led to a
national unemployment insurance scheme for waged workers, as
weil as the collectivisation and 'solidarisation' of schemes cover-
ing the risks of industrial injury, invalidity and sickness. As for the
fiTst, the funds were merged into national schemes, with provi-
sjans harmonized and ultimately replaced by uniform, national
schemes. As for the secand, entitlement conditions were broad-
ened to encompass larger papulations of insured workers; bad
risks were no long er excluded and contributions levied as a per-
centage af the wage and na langer related to differences in risk.
These new schemes and regulations mostly taak effect in the
1950s and 1960s, creating extensive horizontal, as weil as verti-
cal salidarity in the Dutch system of sociaI security. With good
,
;
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risks in effect paying foT bad risks and higher earners foT those on
lower incomes, different generations, professional groups, social
classes and categories of risk were 'connected' to each other.
The process of collectivisation and 'solidarisation' was boosted
in the 1960s when the Christian-Democrat, Veldkamp, became
Minister foT Social Affairs. Possibly encouraged by the economic
prosperity of those years, he formulated a new, broader legit-
imizing principle foT social security, holding that 'every citizen has
a right to self-realization and to equality of chances' (TK
1962/63). This principle had its strongest effect on the new dis-
ability schemes constructed during this period. [t stressed the gen-
eral, societal character of social risks and the mutual responsibili-
ty citizens therefore have foT each other's life chances. It regard-
ed the right to social security as universal and unconditional, and
thus lacked the element of reciprocity which formed the basis of
Van Rhijn's legitimizing principle.
With the final implementation of the revised disability insur-
ance foT all citizens in 1976, this period of expansion, collectivi-
sation and 'solidarisation' came to an end. Veldkamp's principle
started to loge its appeal as the effects of the fiTst oil crisis were
feit and the economic optimism of the 1960s gave way to cau-
tion, followed by pessimism and ultimately, a deep crisis in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. The government's response will be
discussed in the next section. But to fully assess the significance
of these developments it is fiTst necessary to understand the basic
features of the Dutch social security system as it had developed up
'I' to the late 1970s.
In essence it comprised three schemes (whose structures
'! remain intact, despite the revisions of the last decade)(2). First,
:l there are the so-called people's insurances, covering the demo-
1/ graphic risks of old age (AOW), survivors (AWW) and child bene-
i fit (AKW), as weil as long-term disablement (AAW). These are
.j compulsory, contributory, and non means-tested national insur-
i ance schemes to which all citizens are entitled. Waged workers
: and the self-employed pay contributions that are proportional to
,1 income; benefits are paid at a flat rate subsistence level (in prac-
i! tice the level of the statutory minimum wage).
I1 Secondly, there are the so-called workers' insurances, cover-
ing unemployment (WW), long-term disablement (WAO) and sick-
ness (ZW). These schemes are also compulsory, contributory and
non means-tested, but are confined to employees (with the excep-
tion of civil servants, foT whom there are separate schemes).
Contributions are paid as a percentage of wages, while benefits
are wage-related. Finally, there is the safety net of socio! assis-
tance foT all citizens. Social assistance is non-contributory and
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on paid from general taxes. It is means-tested, with tests on the
cial assets and incomes of claimants and their partners. Benefits are
up to subsistence level.
ted It is important to note that the level of all non wage-related
me benefits is linked to the level of the statutory minimum wage,
nic which in turn is adjusted yearly according to shifts in wages and
~it- prices. This ensures that beneficiaries share in growing overall




lili- The collectivist, solidaristic system had its heyday between the late
rd- 1960s and the early 1980s. Since then it has been under per-
nd man ent reconstruction. The reasons for this differ between the
of various schemes and their general character has accordingly
changed in different ways. Here we will sketch the main develop-Jr- ments.
vi- Of fiTst and crucial importante was the steady increase in
)Ie claims foT insurance benefits and social assistance in the 1970s
~re and the alarmingly steep rise in the numbers dependent on unem-
lU- ployment benefits and assistance between 1978 and 1982. As
fle Table 1 shows, the numbers claiming unemployment benefits
be doubled from 1970 to 1978, and doubled again between 1978
ce and 1982, while the number of social assistance beneficiaries
.ic increased in the fiTst eight years by 100,000, and by more than
lp 250,000 in the next fouT years. Disability claims showed a stead-
ier, but by no means less significant, growth. Due to the braad def-es inition of disability, based on Veldkamp's universal principle, the
it, scheme had low access thresholds and attracted many cIder work-
D- eTS who, under more stringent entitlement criteria, would have
e- been laid off and become unemployed. In other words, the num-
re bef of beneficiaries under the disability scheme masked a large
r- pool of 'hidden' unemployment. The number fase steadily, from
rs 215,000 in 1970 to 707,000 in 1982.
fo For many contemporary policy-makers, the lessons of the
F- economic crisis were clear: the system was overloaded and might
f eventually collapse. The initial reaction was to try to control social
r- expenditure by reducing the duration and level of benefits. This
(- approach was known as 'price' policy, because it was mainly
d directed at keeping the system affordable. However, by 1990 the
)- number of workers' insurance beneficiaries had increased by over
j. 300,000, more than offsetting the decline in social assistance
:s claimants over the same period. Subsequently the emphasis shift-
;- ed to 'volume' policies aimed at reducing entitlement and con-
d trolling the inflow of beneficiaries.
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The reconstruction of the people's insurances was, however,
not simply the product of economic developments. It also reflect-
ed broader changes in Dutch society and culture. One aim was to
make provisions more consistent with the changing roles of men
and wamen, particularly women's increased labour force partid-
pation. Here 'modernization' resulted in equal rights for men and
wamen in all schemes. The 1980s saw improvements to women's
state pension rights and the 'individualisation' of benefits raid to
members of one household with the husband and wife each being
raid 50 per cent instead of a 100 per cent for the man). Rather
belatedly, in 1996, widowers were granted the same rights as wid-
ows to the state survivors' scheme. Despite pressure from
women's' movements, this process of individualisation has not
yet, however, been extended to sodal assistance. Here individual-
isation would have entailed not only the abolition of the test on a
partner's means, but also a dramatic increase in social assistance
expenditure. While budgetary and economic arguments were not
robust enough to prevent same improvement in rights to pension
and survivor's benefits, they played a crudal fale in shaping
reconstruction. 'Modernisation' resulting in a broadening of enti-
tIements conflicted with the wider aim of cutting back on soda!
expenditure. The solution was that means tests were introduced
to keep total expenditure under control.
There is no doubt that these measures contributed to halting
the growth in benefidaries and sodal security expenditures. The
system's collapse was prevented. On the other hand, it is clear
that at present there is no prospect of a substantial decrease in
demand and expenditures. Table 1, for instance, shows that in
1994 only claimant numbers for sickness benefit and sodal assis-
tance have dropped significantly since 1986.
Table 1: Numbers receiving benefits (in 'OOO's)
Peoples insurances Workers insurances Social
,'; assistance
Pension Survivors Chikl Unemp. Disability Sick ARW
AOW AWW Benefit WW AAW; ZW RWW
AKW WAO
1970 1061 154 1614 25 215 223 318
1974 1171 162 1734 56 313 261 423
i 1978 1280 169 1763 48 579 289 419
" 1982 1376 172 2185 112 707 261 684
1986 1898 173 2113 68 778 263 740
1990 2043 195 1812 163 881 348 530
! 1994 2152 194 1812 332 894 175 519
i
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~ver, Table 2, showing sodal security expenditure as a percentage
lect- of the net domestic product, confirms that the late 1970s and
IS to early 1980s were the years in which expenditures exploded. But
l1en it also shows that the decrease since has been slow.
"ticdi- Table 2: Social security expenditure as % of Net Domestic
an Product
an's








lal- 1994 18,cc c, ,
n a ,: ; :'..::,:" i
1ce Source: Ctsv, 1995 p15
not
ion A similar pattem can be seen in Table 3, which shows the so-
ing ca\1ed I/A ratio: the number of beneficiàries ('inactives') per 100
1ti- workers ('actives'). There is a steady increase during the 1970s,
:ial with acceleration from 1980 to 1985, but the ratio decreases
:ed only slowly af ter that, even if accounted for by the 'greying' of
Dutch society.
~~ Table 3 I/A Ratio (number of beneficiaries per 100 workers)
!ar
Yar Pensioners incilKled Pensioners Excluded
in
in 1970 46 16







Viewing such data, the govemment came to realize that its initial
'price' policy and the subsequent 'volume' policy were not enough
to reduce social security expenditure substantia\1y, nor to solve the
problems of economic inactivity amongst a large section of the
population. Gradually, therefore, it has developed a new concept
of social protection, the care of which seems to be a fundamen-
tal critique of the model of co\1ective solidarity itself. Changes to
the system were no langer justified purelyon budgetary and eco-
nomic grounds, but more and more in the belief that prindpled
change was essential. This new approach was first formulated in
a govemment paper on the distribution of social security respon-
,
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sibilities between state and its social partners (TK 87/88). They
were subsequently elaborated (e.g. in a strategic policy paper from
the Ministry of Social Affairs (SZW 1991) and reiterated in the
report of a parliamentary inquiry into the administration of socia!
insurances (TK 92/93) as weil as in the proposals of the Dutch
Scientific Council for Govemment Policy (e.g. WRR 1994).
These sources suggest that the main objection of politicians
and policy-makers to the model of collective solidarity is its
anonymity. The national and collective nature of the system is
held to undermine individual responsibility and promote calcula-
I tive behaviour by all actors involved, be it citizens, workers,
I employers, unions or companies. The prevention of unemploy-
, ment, sickness and disability as weIl as the reintegration of dis-
! abled and unemployed workers has been neglected because it is
in nobody' sinterest. This 'modem carelessness' (Schuyt, 1995) in
fact means that moral hazard, broadly defined, is geen as the care
problem of the model of collective solidarity. In this view the main
reason for the high demand for protection, and the associated
1  drain on the public purse, is an obscure and failing structure of
responsibilities and obligations allocated to the different actors
involved. According to this diagnosis, public dependency can only
be countered by the introduction of market disciplines and the re-
'\ establishment of freedom of choice and risk differentiation. These
i would secure individual responsibility by way of confronting all
I actors more directly with the casts of social protection. This diag-
J! nosis is also the starting point for 'activation' policies aimed at the
(re-) insertion of beneficiaries into paid and even unpaid work.
, A second criticism of the model of collective solidarity, centra!
, to the above reports, is that it is inconsistent with modem rela-
tions between the state and citizens. Social security is thus
touched by a general trend towards decreasing the fale of gov-
emment in society: govemment should confine its interventions
to guaranteeing minimum income protection, while individuals
and social groups should organize supplemental protection at the
individual or semi-collective level.
Thus the Dutch political discourse on social security is no
langer dominated by Veldkamp's universal and unconditional
principle, but by notions of individual responsibility, conditionali-
ty, minimum protection and the logic of market-ied private insur-
ance. In short, the reconstruction of the Dutch system of socia!
security has been led in the first instance by economic concerns
and, to alesser extent, by culturally based arguments, with reform
proposals increasingly justified in terms of what are presented as
the fundamental flaws of the model of collective solidarity. Let us
now look in more detail at what has happened to the various
schemes.
-
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~y People's insurances
~ The ~niversal state insurance schemes have become both more
~I selectlve and more complex since the early 19805. Implementing
h equal rights for men and wamen, in the context of a declining wel-
fare budget, has meant the introduction of means tests in the cid
5 age and survivors schemes, whilst child benefit, though still not




"lo The reconstruction of the survivors' insurance scheme (AWW)
- began in the second half of the 19805 but only resulted in the new
; ANW in 1996. The ANW tackles a number of problems associ-
1 ated with the cId AWW which were primarily attributed to various
~ socio-cultural developments. The main problem was that AWW
I was designed for those situations, predominant in the 19505, in
I which the male partner is the breadwinner. This implied both that
f widowers were not entitled to the benefit (they would still have
their own income if their partner died) and no means testing (wid-
ows by definition were needy since none would have an income
of their own). However, the changing roles of men and wamen
and the latter's increasing labour force participation has under-
mined the male breadwinner model. A second problem was that
AWW was designed for married couples, implying that survivors
of unmarried couples were not entitled to the benefit. Unmarried
cohabitation, however, has become a common and accepted pat-
tem in the Netherlands, resulting in pressure to extend the cover-
age of the survivors' scheme to unmarried couples.
Onder the 1996 ANW, males and unmarried couples are enti-
tIed to receive benefits, but to allow for the increased labour par-
ticipation of wamen, eligibility was otherwise substantially cur-
tailed. Most importantly, for survivors with no dependent children
under eighteen who were not disabled, entitlement was confined
to those bom before 1950 (younger people are supposed to work
and have an income). Secondly, recognition of the fact that wid-
owhood did not automatically entail 'need' combined with pres-
sure to reduce expenditure, led to the introduction of a means
test. Unlike AWW the new ANW benefit is clearly intended only
for those widows and widowers who are not able to eam a living
and the number of beneficiaries is likely to drop substantially (from
same 190,000 at present to same 25,000 by 2015). This is
mainly due to the fact that by 2015 most of the potential
claimants will be sixty-five and thus entitled to cid age pensions.
t
,
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With its means test and sharp cuts in coverage the ANW thus
deviates strongly trom the traditional Dutch idea of universal peo-
ple's insurance and what remains of social protection tor widows
looks very much like a social assistance scheme tor a specified cat-
egory .
Old age Insurance
The 1957 old age insurance scheme (AOW) was very much a
child of its time in the sense that, like the survivors scheme, it was
designed around the male breadwinner. lts adjustment, in 1985,
recognized women's changing roles, particularly their increased
labour force participation and was strongly influenced by the
Third EC Directive on equal treatment of men and wamen in
social security. Under the 1957 scheme if a husband reached the
age of sixty five before his wife he received a benefit equal to a
100 per cent of the minimum wage, but woman who became
sixty five before their husbands were not entitled to anything,
while single people received a benefit of 70 per cent of the mini-
mum wage.
These anomalies were removed in 1985 when the right to
1 AOW was 'individualized', with each partner gaining a right to 50
I per cent of the level of the minimum wage. (As aresuIt the num-
;! bef of beneficiaries increased substantially; see Table 1.) In 1987
the scheme was adjusted further to take into account the tact that
cohabitation among pensioners had become a widely accepted
reality. Under the revisions married and unmarried couples were
to be treated equally. In 1988, however, a means test was intro-
duced tor cases in which the partner is under sixty five, the test
being on the partner's income, not that of the pensioner. For pen-
sioners with partners under sixty five the level of the individual
benefit is ncw 50 per cent of the minimum wage, which can be
supplemented by a maximum of another 50 per cent, depending
1 on the partner's income.
; As elsewhere in Europe, concern over the potential welfare
I casts of a 'greying' society (prognoses are that by the year 2020
nearly 25 per cent of the population will be over sixty-five) means
that the AOW scheme is still subject to controversy. Various pro-
posals have been mooted, ranging trom increasing citizens' con-
tributions and/or the pensionable age to introducing substantial
state subventions. But, as yet, proposals to extend means testing
to pensioners remain politically taboo.
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Child benefit
The 1963 child benefit scheme (AKW) has been repeatedly
adjusted over the last twenty years in various major and minor
ways. The overall trend, however, has been one of reductions in
bath coverage and benefit levels, bath aimed at and producing a
decrease in public expenditure. In 1986, for instance, child bene-
fit for eighteen to twenty seven year aids was abolished, while, in
1992, sixteen and seventeen year aids employed under the Youth
Work Guarantee Scheme (JWG) also lost their entitlement. Since
1983 benefit levels, which, initially were independent of a child's
age, have been revised, leading to lower benefits for younger (less
costly) children. Further cuts came with the abolition of the pro-
gressiveness of benefits in 1995. Until then the level of benefit
per child was higher the more children there were in a family. As
a result of these measures social protection, particularly for larg-
er families, has diminished substantially.
Workers lnsurances
In 1985, soon af ter the economic crisis of the late 19705 and
early 19805 reached its peak, the benefit levels of all the workers'
insurance schemes (unemployment, disability, sickness) were
reduced from 80 to 70 per cent of claimants' previous earnings.
Further reform measures followed in two major phases. The first
taak effect in 1987 and encompassed all schemesj the second (introduced between 1992 and 1994 concerned the sickness and '
disability schemes.
Unemployment
In 1987 the 1949 unemployment insurance scheme (WW) was
replaced by new legislation, the most important feature of which
was the introduction of more stringent work history requirements
for determining bath entitlement and the duration of benefit pay-
ments. Under the new WW, claimants have to have worked at
least twenty six weeks ( in stead of only 130 days) in the previous
fifty two . The wage-related benefit was limited to half a year on
principle af ter which it is replaced by a non means-tested flat rate
benefit paid at 70 per cent of the minimum wage level for one
year. (The half-year wage-related benefit could be prolonged if
individuals had a langer employment record, i.e. if they had
worked for at least three years in the last five). Those who remain
unemployed then have to claim means-tested social assistance.
Eventually then, all the long-term unemployed will end up on
social assistance. In 1995, when unemployment figures had
increased again (see table 1), the eligibility criteria were further
tightened. Entitlement became conditional on a combination of
!
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having worked twenty six weeks in the last thirty nine instead of
fifty two and the right to the prolonged wage-related benefit now
depends on having worked four out of live years instead of three
out of live.
These changes mean that adequate protection against the
financial consequences of unemployrnent has become increasing-
ly confined to workers with regular and langer lasting labour mar-
ket ties. Other groups experience more difficulty in gaining enti-
tIement to a wage-related benefit, especially the young, people
with flexible labour contracts and people with repeated unem-
ployment spelIs. Currently same 45 to 50 per cent of the work-
ing population cannot meet the combined criteria of twenty six
weeks out of thirty nine and four years out of live. In the case of
unemployrnent these workers will have to rely on social assis-
tance, either immediately or following a short period in which
they are entitled to the non means-tested flat-rate minimum ben-
efit.
Disability
The 1967 disability insurance scheme (WAO) was also revised in
the 1987 restructuring. Here the most important change was the
abolition of the provision whereby disability benefit compensated
lor the paar labour market opportunities experienced by partially
disabled workers. Up to 1987 partially disabled individuals with-
out a job received a ruIl wage-related disability benefit lor as long
as their disability lasted, on the premise that their chances on the
labour market were nearly zero. It was this system, combined with
the unlimited duration of the WAO benefit, which made WAO
much more attractive than the unemployrnent scheme, WW.
From 1987, however, partially disabled workers without a job
became entitled to apartial, instead of a ruIl, wage-related disabil-
ity benefit, and an unemployment benefit (WW) in respect of their
unemployrnent. For many partly disabled workers this meant a
substantial reduction in income. As Table 1 shows these measures
did not, however, prevent a further increase in the number of dis-
ability beneficiaries, concern over which led to further legislation
in the early 1990s. First in 1992, the 'lawon reducing the dis-
ability volume' (TAV) introduced stronger incentives lor employers
to prevent claims lor disability benefits. It established a 'bonus-
malus-system' giving employers a subsidy if they employ a dis-
abled worker lor at least a year. In addition to this once-off sub-
sidy, a 20 per cent wage subsidy is also provided. But employers
have to pay a fine or 'malus' if one of their employees is disabled
at work and has to be fired. The fine turned out to be bath very
unpopular with employers and difficult to implement and as a
result was abolished in 1996.
~, ~
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of In 1993 a second 'Iawon reducing disability claims', the TBA,
ow was introduced, again reducing the 'attractiveness' of disability
ree compared to unemployment insurance. Firstly, the benchmark tor
assessing the degree of disability was changed. This used to be the
the degree to which incapacitated workers could continue to earn a
19- living with 'suitable work', defined as work appropriate to an indi-
ar- vidual's educationallevel and farmer type and level of job. This
1ti- was broadened to 'generally accepted work', not connected with
ple educational or farmer job levels. As a result more jobs are regard-
m- ed as in principle being available tor the disabled, making it more
rk- difficult tor any worker to be assessed as incapacitated tor work.
six Secondly, every existing beneficiary of the WAO benefit under
of fifty had to be re-assessed according to the new standard. In the
;is- first two years af ter its implementation this rule resulted in a with-
ich drawal of the tuIl WAO benefit in 50 per cent of all reassessed
~n- cases. Such individuals were declared to be fully unemployed,
instead of being (partially) disabled, and had to claim WW benefit,
with its limited duration. Thirdly, age was introduced as a criteri-
on tor determining the level and duration of benefit. Rather being
. fixed at 70 per cent of previous earnings tor as long as the inca-
In pacity to work lasts, the WAO benefit is set tor a maximum of six
he years tor those over the age of 58, af ter which they become enti-
"d tled to the state pension (AOW). Benefit duration tor younger is
I y shorter than these six years.
th- As Table 1 shows these 'volume' policies of the early 1990s
hg did not produce the hoped-for decline in beneficiaries. In a further
. e attempt to stem the WAO inflow, the government has recently
I~ introduced another reform aimed to foster employer responsibili-
~ ty tor the prevention of disability as weil as the (re-}insertion of dis-
abled workers, the 1998 PEMBA law. This involves two new
~E measures, premium differentiation and opting out or privatisation.
)1, Before PEMBA contributions tor the WAO scheme were not dif-
elr ferentiated according to risk, i.e. to the number of disability claims
: a coming trom individual firms and sectors of industry. AII paid a
~s uniform percentage of wages. Under PEMBA such percentages,
.IS- and thus the amount of contributions, are differentiated according
?n to risk. As aresuIt, firms and sectors of industry that generate
IS- more disability claims have higher costs and thus an incentive to
!rs prevent disability claims, either by improving working conditions,
~s- or by adapting work places tor disabled employees. PEMBA also
IS- offers individual firms the opportunity to opt out of the state sys-
Ib- tem and take responsibility tor providing disability protection and
~rJ benefits tor their employees. (Some large companies have al ready
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Sickness
The revision of the sickness benefit scheme (ZW) started in 1994,
prior to which benefits tor workers who were ill tor less than a
year (af ter which period the disability scheme came into force)
were paid trom the collective sickness fund tor the tuIl period. The
fund was financed by contributions trom employers and employ-
ees. The relation between degree of sickness absenteeism and
casts of insurance was weak since contribution levels only differ-
entiated between branches of industry. Thus, at the level of indi-
vidual firms and workers, incentives to prevent sickness were min-
imal. This changed with the 'lawon reducing sickness absence'
(TZ) introduced in 1994. This obliged employers to pay sick of at
least 70 per cent of their wage tor the first six weeks of absence
(two weeks tor companies with less than 15 employees). Thus,
: the first weeks of sickness were privatized and ceased to be a
drain on the national sickness fund. Employers either paid wages
tor sick employees directly, or, more commonly, reinsured the risk
with private insurance companies. Reducing sickness absenteeism
was further promoted by a second element of TZ which obliged
every firm to institute a sickness absence prevention and control
policy. In 1994, another revision was also implemented - as a
result of the earlier mentioned TAV law. This introduced differen-
tial contributions tor sickness benefit according to industry sec-
tors, with firms with a higher absenteeism than their sector's aver-
age paying higher contributions.
The TZ, especially the part concerning privatisation of the first
: weeks of sickness benefit, had an immediate and significant effect
on the national sickness fund. In 1993, 345,000 sickness benefi-
ciaries were paid compared to only 175,000 in 1994. By 1994
the percentage of reported absenteeism had dropped trom 7 to 4
1/2 of total labour time and has stayed at this lower level since
(Ctsv, 1995, p.65). Although there is a natural floor to this per-
centage, the government hoped that further privatisation would
lead to another drop in absenteeism. 1997 saw the implementa-
tion of legislation to this effect, under the WULBZ law, which
extended the period in which employers had to pay wages to sick
personnel to one year. ZW still covers the sickness risk of speci-
lied categories (estimated at 15 per cent of the previously covered
population), such as pregnant wamen, (partially) disabled workers,
people on temporary contracts and apprentices. But tor the
majority of Dutch workers ZW has, in effect, been abolished and
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The privatisation and differentiation of contributions according
to risks in bath the disability and sickness schemes have, as was
'I anticipated, been matched by falls in the annual growth in WAO
; disability claimants and a decline in the numbers claiming sickness
, benefits (TabIe 1). However, these improvements to the public
purse have had not been without their casts, particuIarly in terms
of the labour market chances of people with health problems.
Evaluation studies (discussed in SCP 1996) have shown that the
chronically ill and (partially) disabled face increased difficulties in
(re-)entering work. Employer health screening of potential
employees has become more stringent, whilst the likelihood of
workers with a worse health status being made redundant has
increased. The use of temporary labour contracts as a means of
prolonging the period for screening employees' 'sickness leave
behaviour' nearly doubled (from 1993 to 1995 from 11 to 20 per
cent of alllabour contracts). Over the same period the practice of
hiring workers via employment agencies to avoid the cast of
potential sick pay also fase - from 4 to 9 per cent (SCP 1996).
Social assistance
The social assistance scheme (ABW), implemented in 1965,
introduced state-financed minimum income protection into the
Dutch social security system. Functioning as a last resort safety
net, ABW was means-tested and, in order to tailor benefits to indi-
vidual circumstances, a complicated set of national benefit rates
evolved over the years. These differed according to a claimant's
labour market opportunities, household composition, age, and
cause of neediness. With the onset of economic crisis in the
1970s the number of beneficiaries fase rapidly (from same
300,000 in 1970 to as many as 740,000 in 1986, Table 1).
Subsequently beneficiary numbers began to fall, but not as rapid-
Iy as they had increased. This partly reflected the impact of the
reform of the insurance schemes, which created extra demand for
assistance (reassessed disabled workers, widows barn af ter 1950,
the unemployed whose insurance benefit had expired). But it also
reflected the very limited labour market chances of social assis-
tance clientele.
In the early 1990s, revelations of alarming figures on the
abuse and misuse of social assistance led to a parliamentary
inquiry into the structure and administration of the scheme. The
resulting report contained various critiques, the most important of
which were that the system had become too complex and was
consequently inefficient, that there was too little con trol of cohab-
itation and the rea I casts of living, th at local differences in the co st
'-"-
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il! of living were not recognised in benefit payments and that the
administration made toa little effort to (re-)integrate its clients into
the labour market (TK 93/94).
In 1996, social assistance was radically revised to meet these
criticisms. Firstly, the system of benefit rates was simplified into
three rates, with single people receiving 50 per cent of the mini-
mum wage, single parents seventy and couples a 100 per cent.
Single people and single parents could also apply tor a 20 per
cent supplement, in which case they have to prove that the basic
rate is toa low tor their particular circumstances as singles. The
anus tor proving 'single' status was shifted to the claimant rather
than the administration as in the past. Young people under twen-
ty-one could only claim in exceptional cases: if in need, the prin-
ciple is that they have to accept a job within the Youth Work
Guarantee Scheme.
Secondly, to gear benefits more effectively to local and per-
sonal circumstances, the administrating municipalities were oblig-
ed to design and implement an 'assistance supplements policy',
specifying the rules under which beneficiaries can claim supple-
ments to their basic benefit (such as subsidies tor training or edu-
cation, casts related to part-time work, special needs etc.).
Thirdly, beneficiaries have to be 'activated' to participate in the
labour market. This policy has been implemented in different
:; ways. Since 1996, every claimant has the duty to find a job, the
only exception being those over fifty-seven and a half and single
parents with children under five. The standard of 'suitable work'
has been broadened, with clients expected to accept jobs
'beneath' their educational and previous job levels. Liaising close-
ly with the district labour office the administration is obliged to
design and implement an individual plan tor (re-)insertion tor each
client with a reasonable chance on the labour market.
" Finally, the new scheme recognizes that nearly half of social
~, assistance claimants have little real chance of finding direct paid
employment. Toencourage the able-bodied unemployed and pre-
vent social isolation, the municipalities have been given powers to
establish 'social activation' programmes whereby clients can be
released trom the obligation to look tor a paid job tor a certain
period if they undertake voluntary or community work. In short,
the restructuring of ABW has heightened municipal responsibility
and discretion and led to an increasing emphasis on getting peo-
ple (back) into work.
,-
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e Conclusions
:> The Dutch system of social security expanded rapidly af ter the
" Second World War as protection against life cycle and social risks
; developed along the two main lines of collectivisation and soli-
- darisation. The first meant separate social insurance funds, orga-
nized locally or within sectors of industry, were merged into
r national funds, and existing schemes covering diverse risks were
. harmonized and ultimately replaced by one uniform, national
: scheme. The second meant entitlement conditions were extended. to Cover broader groups of workers and citizens, bad risks were
not excluded, and contributions levied according to financial
capacity not differences in actuarial risk. These principles, imple-
mented in the 1950s and 1960s, created large scale horizontal
solidarity (good risks paying tor bad), as weil as vertical solidarity
(higher earners paying tor lower incomes). To ensure effective
functioning participation was made compulsory tor all the actors
involved.
However, the economic recession of the late 1970s and early
1980s forced a thorough reconstruction of the system. Partly as
an explicit aim, but certainly as an overall resuIt of the measures
taken, it has taken on a much more selective character. This is
manifest not only in the introduction of means testing in the cId
age and the survivors' schemes (AOW, ANW) but in the restricted
entitlement and coverage of the survivors', unemployment and
disability schemes and the increased fale of means-tested social
assistance, whose clientele ncw includes young widows,
reassessed disabled workers and unemployed flexi-workers.
Overall the likelihood of dependency on means-tested social assis-
tance rather than non means-tested insurance benefits has
increased tor every beneficiary under the age of 65.
Restructuring has thus undermined the cId relations of solidar-
ity and the system's collectivist base. Cuts in coverage, benefit lev-
els and the duration of benefit payments, and privatisation have
led to increased individual responsibility tor all the actors involved.
Employers, tor instance, have new responsibilities tor sick pay
and the prevention of disability, while workers and citizens in gen-
eral are less protected by the state. The devolution of social assis-
tance policy to local government means the system has also lost
part of its collectivist character. AII in all, a shift has taken place
away trom inclusive solidarity to more exclusive selectivity and
trom collective responsibility to individual responsibility.
The overall decline in citizen's social protection, however, has
not affected everybody to the same degree. In same instances
trade union pressure has persuaded employing organisations to
~
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'repair' the gap by providing occupational benefits. This applies
particularly to disability where many employers have agreed to
supplement flat rate benefits under the new state scheme by up to
70 per cent of an individual's previous wage. Indeed such agree-
ments have plugged the 'WAO-gap' for nearly 80 per cent of the
workforce. Offsetting other losses through collective bargaining,
however, has been confined to far smaller sectors of the working
population, primarily those in higher paid, permanent jobs with
continuous work histories. Perhaps more significantly, the loss of
collective social protection has also been compensated at the
household level as a result of the increased labour market partici-
pation of wamen. The accompanying rise in dual income house-
holds means that the misfortunes of one partner can be compen-
sated by the other's earnings.
Clearly, however, those who have lost most social protection
are people with weaker or no ties to the market for paid labour
and whose households aften include more than one 'non-earner'.
:i These include workers on flexible contracts, the young, those with
11 repeated unemployment spelIs, and groups who have little chance
.f of gaining employment, such as pensioners, disabled workers, the
long term unemployed and single parents.
The overall effects of the restructuring of the last two decades
has, however, been recognized by the present central govern-
ment, inspiring it to decIare 'work, work, and again work' (a pop-
ular slogan of ten used by Prime Minister Kok and his cabinet
members) as the central aim of its socio-economic policy. It sees
social protection of citizens as best guaranteed by their labour
market participation. In this respect two opposing views are reg-
ularly expressed in the Dutch media. The pessimistic view, held
primarily by anti-poverty lobbyists and the 'strong left', contends
that ongoing rises in labour productivity resulting from interna-
tional competition and technological development mean that
Dutch society will never again need its fulllabour force to produce
its wealth. High levels of economic 'inactivity' are, in this view, a
structural feature of future society, leading to problems of how to
organize social participation, inclusion and (re-) distribution of
wealth by means other than the labour market. The optimistic
view, upheld by the political middle and right, however, holds that
demographic trends are such that within the next twenty years,
The Netherlands will have a serious labour shortage as post-war
'baby boomers' retire and give way to much smaller birth cohorts.
We will have to wait and see what happens. At present, for
the first time in many years, Dutch political partjes are again com-
peting publicly with each other on their 'positive social image'
rather than proposals for reducing social expenditure. Whether
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S th is portends a real break with the recent history of a retrenching
) welfare state, or is just a manifestation of the fact that 1998 is an
election year remains to be seen.
Notes
(1). This chapter is an updated summary of the principal argu-
ments contained in a book f co-authored. ft is entitled Solidair of
Selectief? Een evaluatie van toepassing van het selectieve-markt-
model in de sociale zekerheid ('Solidary or Selective? An evalua-
tion of applying the selective-market-model in social security') by
Wim van aorschot, Cees Boos and Louis Geleijnse, published in
1996 by Kluwer, Deventer, The Netherlands




General Social Assistance Act
AKW Algemene Kinderbijslag
General Child Benefit Act
ANW Algemene Nabestaanden Wet
General Suruiuors' Benefit Act
AOW Algemene Ouderdomswet
General Old Age Benefit Act
AWW Algemene Weduwen en Wezen Wet
General Widows and Orphans Benefit Act
PEMBA Premie-differentiatie en Marktwerking in de
Ar be idso n g esch ikth e idsverze kering
Act on Premium differentiation and Market
Competition in the Disabi/ity
Insurances
RWW Rijksgroepsregeling Werkloze Werknemers
Social Assistance lor Unemployed Workers
SZW Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
TAV Wet Terugdringing Arbeidsongeschiktheids Volume
Act on Reducing the Disabi/ity Volume
TBA Wet Terugdringing Beroep op de
Arbe idso n g esch i kth e id sverzekerin g
Act on Reducing Disabi/ity Claims
TK Handelingen der Tweede Kamer
Minutes of Par/iament
TZ Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim
Act on Reducing Sickness Ansence
(~
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WAO Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering
Act on Disability Insurance
WULBZ Wet Uitbreiding Loondoorbetalingsverplichting
bij Ziekte






WRR Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid
Scientific Council for Government Policy
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